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I.Introduction
The response of the blood industry and the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) to the problem of acquired immune deciency syndrome
(AIDS)1 in the nation's2 blood supply has been called inadequate and abysmal,3
1AIDS is a disease in which certain white blood cells, the T-helper cells, are gradually
depleted, thereby causing an individual's immune system to break down. Linda M. Dorney,
Culpable Conduct with Impunity: The Blood lndustty and the FDA '5 Responsibility for the
Spread of AIDS Through Blood Products, 3 Ohio N.U.J. Pharmacy & L. 129, 138 (1991).
2This paper only covers the problem of AIDS in the American blood supply and does not
address the problems that occurred in France involving AIDS-contaminated blood. In October
of 1 992, three former French governmental ocials were convicted of failing to stop the
distributin of HIVinfected blood clotting factors to hemophiliacs in 1 985. Three Physicians
Convicted in French 'Blood-Supp'~y Trial Science, Oct. 30, 1992; Transfusion of Death, The
Washington Post, May 29, 1 993 at Dl. France's National Center of Blood Transfusion (CNTS)
was aware that the blood clotting factors were contaminated with the AIDS virus in March of
1 985. Bad Blood in France, Time, July 8,1991 at 48; French AIDS Scandal, The Washington
Post, Nov. 5,1991, at Z7; A Deadly 'Market Share', The Washington Post, Nov. 11, 1 991, at
Al 9. Yet government ocials knowingly distributed the infected products until their existing
stock ran out in October of 1 985, without employing the heat-treatment technique that was
available at that time and would have killed the AIDS virus present in the factors. France's
Ministers of Bad Blood, U.S. News & World Report, Jan. 1 8, 1 993 at 69; Three Physicians
Convicted, supra. For additional information regarding these events, see also France's Blood
Scandal Draws Blood, Nature, Oct. 29, 1992, at 759; Verdict in French Blood Trial Shames
Science, Nature, Oct. 29, 1992 at 764; AIDS Scandal Indicts French Government, Nature,
Sept. 19,1991 at 197; Catcalls Disrupt Trial in French AIDS Scandal, The Washington Post,
July 25, 1 992, at Al 5; Transfusion of Death, The Washington Post, May 29, 1993, at Dl.
The French scandal does not have any real policy implications for this paper for the following
reasons: 1) The French ocials distributed blood that they knew was infected with the AIDS
virus, while the U.S. government was simply trying to determine what safeguards to take to
prevent or decrease the possibility that AIDS-infected blood would be distributed to members
of the public, 2) The French scandal revolves around events that occurred in 1 985, at a
later point in the AIDS crisis than is the focus of this paper and indeed at a time of less
uncertainty than was faced by the U.S. government between 1 982 and early 1 985, the time
period this paper is designed to analyze, 3) The CNTS is a branch of government and has
a monopoly on blood for transfusion in France, French AIDS Scandal, supra, and thus the
French government is in a completely dierent position than is the U.S. government when
evaluating how to react to a potential contamination of the blood supply; the government in
France serves as the actual blood and health care provider, whereas the government in the
U.S. serves a a regulator of providers; and 4) The French action was clearly inappropriate,
as has been admitted by the French government (although all involved seem to blame the
others) and is reected by the convictions, whereas the actions taken or not taken by the U.S.
government were more subtle and debatable.
300rney, supra note 1, ati 29.
1unnecessarily slow,4 and woefully inept.5 During the early 1 980s, the AIDS
virus was contaminating our nation's blood supply while the blood industry
and the FDA refused to take appropriate steps to stop it{they, quite simply,
failed us.6 This paper will focus on the time of uncertainty  o the time from
when the rst AIDS case was diagnosed to the time when AIDS testing became
available and widespread. The failure of the FDA to protect the safety of the
blood supply during these years will be examined in detail. The sequence of
events during these years will be recounted and analyzed to determine exactly
what happened, why this breakdown occurred, and what can be done to prevent
such failures from occurring in the future.
II.Background
The blood industry is made up of two major components: 1) the
blood banking industry which collects blood from unpaid volunteer donors to
be used for transfusions, and 2) companies that manufacture blood products
(primarily blood clotting factors for hemophiliacs7) made from plasma that is
often collected from paid donors.8 Approximately one-half of the nation's blood
4Blood Supply Safety: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
of the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce (Blood Supply Safety),
101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 15 (1 990)(testimony of Dr. Ross Eckert, Professor at Claremont
McKenna College); Report of the Presidential Committee on the Human Immunodeciency
Virus Epidemic (1 988) at78.
5Dorney, supra note 1, at 1 30. See also, Gilbert M. Gaul, The Loose Way The FDA
Regulates the Blood Industry, Phila. Inquirer, Sept. 25, 1989, at Al (The government's slow-
ness in responding to the AIDS threat to the blood supply is evident, government regulators
have dragged their feet), Blood Supply Safety, supra note 4, at 5 (statement of Congressman
Wyden,segments of the blood industry dragged their feet on safety issues in the early 1 980's).
6Blood Supply Safety, supra note 4, at 11 (testimony of Dr. Marcus Conant, Professor at
the University of California Medical Center at San Francisco).
7Factor concentrate is the prevailing product in the treatment of hemophilia, a blood
clotting disorder, for without such treatment the patient would eventually bleed to death.
Lynnette S. Pisone, Case Note, Walls v. Armour: Upholding the Principles of Liability, 3
Ohio N.U.J. Pharmacy & L. 225, 226 (1991).
8Dorney, supra note 1, at 131-3.
2is collected by the American Red Cross.9 The rest of the blood is collected by
blood banks who are members of either the American Association of Blood
Banks (AABB) or the Council of Community Blood Centers (CCBC).10
The entire blood industry is rmly under federal regulation through
the FDA. Blood and blood products are biologics, and biological products are
subject to FDA regulation under x351 of the Public Health Service Act (also
known as the Biologics Act).11 FDA authority under x351 includes licensing and
inspection of relevant facilities.12 Under x361 of the Public Health Service Act,13
the FDA is authorized to promulgate regulations to prevent the introduction,
transmission, or spread of blood-related communicable disease from one state to
another.14 In addition, all biological products are also drugs within the meaning
of x201(g)(1) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and are thus subject
to regulation by the FDA as drugs as well.15 Thus the FDA has a clear duty to
protect the safety of the blood supply in this country.
Ill.What Happened?: The Crisis of AIDS in the Blood Supply
The rst case of AIDS was reported by the CDG in 1981.16 Dr.
Donald Francis, an epidemiologist for the CDC at the time, and Dr. Max Essex,
a retrovirology expert at the Harvard School of Public Health, immediately






1440 Fed. Reg. 53040 (1975).
1538 Fed. Reg. 4319 (1973).
16Post~~Trans fusion AIDS Cases Require Special Strategies, 5 BNA Civil Trial Manual
no. 4 at 90, 92 (March 22, 1989); Dorney, supra note 1, at 1 39-40.
17Frontune: AIDS, Blood, and Politics (PBS television broadcast, Nov 30, 1 993)(here-
3cases of immune suppression, including 184 deaths, had been reported to the
CDC, and the GDC was calling the outbreak an epidemic.18
On July 1 6, 1 982, the CDC announced three cases of apparent
AIDS in hemophiliacs that received blood clotting factors.19 Hemophiliacs tend
to be the rst group to become infected by a new infectious agent in the blood
supply20 because the factor concentrate they use is made from pooled plasma
from thousands of donors.21 The three hemophiliacs that had contracted AIDS
had no apparent risk factors except that they used large amounts of clotting
factors.22 As a result of this development, the CDC called an emergency meet-
ing to warn the blood industry and hemophiliacs that the clotting factors might
be contaminated.23 Representatives from the CDC, the FDA, the American
Red Cross, the American Association of Blood Banks (AABB), the National
Institutes of Health (NIH), the National Hemophilia Foundation and the Na-
tional Gay Task Force were present at the meeting on July 27, 1982.24 The
CDC told the group that AIDS had characteristics which suggest an infectious
etiology and that it might be transmitted through blood products.25 The CDC
recommended that donor deferral guidelines be put in place, namely that peo-
ple who t into the high-risk groups (gay men, Haitians, and intravenous drug
users) should be asked not to donate blood.26 However, their proposal was not
inafter Frontline).
18Randy Shilts, And The Band Played On 1 68 (1 987).
19BNA, supra note 1 6, at 93; Dorney, supra note 1, at 140.
20Frontline, supra note 1 7.
21Pisone, supra note 7, at 226.
22Gaul, supra note 5.
23Frontline, supra note 1 7.
24BNA, supra note 1 6, at 93.
25Id.
26Shilts, supra note 1 8, at 1 70; Dorney, supra note 1, at 142.
4well received. The gay representatives objected, claiming it was too soon to
implement such guidelines and arguing that there would be civil rights implica-
tions.27 The National Hemophilia Foundation did not want to believe that the
disease was linked to their clotting factors and indeed made it very clear that
this material was revolutionary{revolutionized their lives and it revolutionized
their survival, and please do not take it away, even though it does have a risk.28
The FDA was skeptical as well. Many people at the FDA were not convinced
that the disease existed, and some FDA regulators apparently resented the COG
for invading their territory, the blood industry.29 In fact, in later private con-
versations with CDC ocials, evidently some FDA ocials admitted that they
thought the COG had taken a bunch of unrelated illnesses and lumped them
into some made-up phenomenon as a brazen ruse to get publicity and funding
for their threatened agency.30 In the end, no consensus could be reached as to
any action to take31; instead it was agreed to wait and see what happened.32
The only thing that could be agreed on at this meeting was that the disease
should be named Acquired Immune Deciency Syndrome (AIDS).33
On December 10, 1982, the rst public announcement was made
that AIDS might be in the general blood supply.34 A baby had received platelets
from a donor and both of them had developed AIDS.35 The CDC issued an o-
27Shilts, supra note 1 8, at 1 70.
28Frontline, supra note 1 7.
29Shilts, supra note 18, at 170-1.
301d., at 170.
31BNA, supra note 16, at 93; Dorney, supra note 1, at 142.
32Shilts, supra note 18 at 1 70-1.
33Frontline, supra note 1 7. Previously the disease had been referred to as GRID, or Gay-
Related Immune Deciency. Id.
34Shilts, supra note 1 8, at 206-7.
35Frontline, supra note 1 7.
5cial report entitled Possible Transfusion-Associated AIDS { California claiming
a possible relationship between AIDS and blood transfusions, and stating that
[tihis report and continuing reports of AIDS among persons with hemophilia
raise serious questions about the possible transmission of AIDS through blood
and blood products.36 Following the release of this information, Dr. Joseph
Bove, Director of the blood bank at Yale University Medical Center, an ocer
of the AABB, and chairman of the FDA's Blood Products Advisory Commit-
tee37, went on network television to state that there was simply no evidence
that transfusions spread AIDS.38
On December 1 3, 1 982, the second case of possible transfusion-
related AIDS was reported.39 The CDC met with the FDA's Blood Products
Advisory Committee in December to discuss this new information; however,
Committee members insisted that more proof was needed to show that AIDS
could be transmitted through transfusions.40 The FDA's Advisory Committee,
headed by Dr. Bove, still refused to take action or recommend that high-risk
individuals be encouraged to refrain from donating blood.41 Dr. Bove stated
that there's not enough evidence to nger any population or subset of individuals
and say 'This group should not be allowed to donate blood.'42 According to
Dr. Francis of the COG, they never listened... we put [sic] the problem and we
36Centers for Disease Control, Possible Transfusion-Associated Acquired Immune De-
ciency Syndrome (AIDS) - California, 31 Morbidity and Mortality WkIy. Rep. 3 65-7 (1982).
37The Blood Products Advisory Committee reviews and evaluates data on the safety, eec-
tiveness, and appropriate use of blood products intended for use in the diagnosis, prevention,
or treatement of diseases and then advises the FDA accordingly. 48 Fed. Reg. 54285 (1983).
38Shilts, supra note 1 8, at 207; BNA, supra note 1 6, at 93.
39BNA, supra note 1 6, at 93.
40ShiIts, supra note 1 8, at 206.
41Frontline, supra note 17.
42Id
6gave them the solution and they chose to ignore it.43
The CDC then called another emergency meeting (which this time
was open to the public) for January 4, 1983 to discuss what measures should be
taken to protect the safety of the nation's blood supply.44 The meeting would
later be referred to by participants as that horrible meeting.45 The meeting
served as clear notice to the entire blood industry that AIDS could be transmit-
ted by blood and blood products.46 All interested groups were in attendance:
The American Red Cross, the AABB, the National Hemophilia Foundation,
the National Gay Task Force, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
(representing the commercial blood-product manufacturers), the NIH, and the
FDA.47 Unfortunately, it was clear that each group had come with its own
agenda48 {the gay representatives did not want gays to be stigmatized, the
hemophiliacs did not want the cost of blood products to skyrocket or the sup-
ply to be threatened, and the blood industry did not want to have to start doing
any costly tests.49 Dr. Marcus Conant, Professor at the University of California
Medical Center at San Francisco and AIDS researcher, would later note that
unfortunately, there was no one present at the meeting to represent the public
who would actually be receiving the blood in question.50 It seems, however,
that representing the public is in fact the responsibility and role of the FDA.
43Id.
44Dorney, supra note 1, at 142; Donald C. Drake, The Disease Detectives Puzzle Over
Methods of Control, Phila. Inquirer, Jan. 9, 1983 at Al; Frontline, supra note 17.
45Shilts, supra note 18, at 221.
46Dorney, supra note 1, at 1 43.
47Shilts, supra note 1 8, at 220.
48ld
49Drake, supra note 11.
50Blood Supply Safety, supra note 4, at 9 (testimony of Dr. Marcus Conant).
7At the meeting, it was announced that there had now been 881 cases
of AIDS in the United States, including eight hemophiliacs that had died from
AIDS.51 AIDS was now the second leading cause of death for hemophiliacs.52
Dr. James Curran, leader of the CDC's task force on AIDS, described two
options that could be taken to help stop the spread of this disease through the
blood supply: 1) stop accepting blood donations from high-risk individuals or
2) start testing the actual blood to try to identify likely AIDS carriers.53 The
CDC favored using both approaches.54 Dr. Thomas Spira, a COC virologist,
presented evidence that although there was no test for AIDS, surrogate testing
could be done and could be eective.55 He claimed that virtually everyone in
the high-risk groups had suered from hepatitis B at some point in their lives,
and that he had run studies and found that 88% of the blood from gay AIDS
patients contained hepatitis core antibodies.56 A hepatitis B core antibody test,
then, could be used to identify and eliminate donors with hepatitis, thus serving
as a surrogate test for AIDS by identifying likely high-risk donors. This should
greatly reduce, although not eliminate, the incidence of transmission of AIDS
through blood.
The blood banking industry was hesitant to even accept that AIDS
was spread through blood, much less accept CDC's suggestions for precautionary
measures. Dr. Aaron Kellner of the New York Blood Center immediately raised
51Id.at 2-3.
52Id. at 3.
53Shilts, supra note 18, at 221; Drake, supra note 44.
54Shilts, supra note 1 8, at 221; Dorney, supra note 1, at 1 43.
55Shilts, supra note 18, at 221.
56Id
8the issue of cost and stated We must be careful not to overreact. The evidence
is tenuous.57 Dr. Bove stated We are contemplating all these wide-ranging
measures because one baby got AIDS after transfusion from a person who later
came down with AIDS and there may be a few other cases.58 The CDC was not
happy with the response, and Assistant CDC director Jerey Koplan said: To
bury our heads in the sand and say, 'Let's wait for more cases' is not an adequate
public health measure.59 Dr. Francis was furious, and asked the blood bankers
How many deaths do you need? Give us the threshold of death that you need
in order to believe that this is happening, and we'll meet at that time and we
can start doing something. 60
It was eventually agreed that members of high risk groups should
somehow be excluded from donating blood, but no consensus could be reached
as to how that should be accomplished.61 The representatives of the gay groups
felt that screening out gay donors would be discriminatory and ineective (be-
cause many gay men would not admit to being homosexual), but did agree that
hepatitis core testing should be done62. The blood bankers questioned the value
of a surrogate test that was really only an indirect indication of whether the
blood carried AIDS, and they also worried about the cost.63 In addition, the
blood bankers did not want to exclude gay donors or ask donors explicit ques-
tions for fear of a drastic drop in donations.64 Some of the commercial blood
57Drake, supra note 44.
58Shilts, supra note 18, at 221.
59Id.
60at 220.
61BNA, supra note 16, at 93-4; Dorney, supra note 1, at 143.
62Drake, supra note 44; S hilts, supra note 18, at 222; Front/me, supra note 1 7.
63Drake, supra note 44.
64Dorney, supra note 1, at 1 43-4.
9product companies appeared more willing to take precautions, with in particu-
lar a representative of one of the main companies announcing that his rm had
begun screening donors and excluding high-risk donors, including all gays.65
The FDA appeared wary of the CDC in general.66 In the end, no consensus
was reached, and there was no agreed upon course of action.67 The CDC stood
alone and lost.68
Two days later, all the major blood banking organizations and
the National Gay Task Force met.69 They issued a joint statement opposed to
donor screening, stating that [d]irect or indirect questions about a donor's sexual
preference are inappropriate.70 At the meeting, the blood banking industry
decided that surrogate testing was inadvisable because of the high cost, the
inadequacy of the tests, and the unconvincing evidence that AIDS was spread
through blood transfusions.71
Then, on January 1 3, 1 983, the American Red Cross, the AABB,
and the CCBB issued another joint statement calling the hypothesis that AIDS
was transmitted by blood inconclusive and still unproven.72 The statement
called for screening of donors for symptoms of AIDS, but did not recommend any
laboratory screening test or donor screening on the basis of sexual preference.73
However, although Dr. Bove was publicly denying that AIDS had been shown
65Drake, supra note 44. See also Shilts, supra note 1 8, at 223.
66Shilts, supra note 1 8, at 222.
671d, at 223.
68Id
691d., at 224; Drake, supra note 44.
70Shilts, supra note 1 8, at 224; Drake, supra note 44.
71Drake, supra note 44.
72BNA, supra note 1 6, at 94; Dorney, supra note 1, at 1 45.
73BNA, supra note 1 6, at 94.
10to be transmitted through blood, he was privately acknowledging the risk. Dr.
Bove was the Chairman of the Committee on Transfusion Transmitted Diseases
for the AABB, and in a condential report to the AABB's Board dated January
24, 1 983, he wrote: While I believe our report reacts appropriately to the data
at hand, I believe that the most we can do in this situation is buy time. There is
little doubt in my mind that additional transfusion related cases and additional
cases in patients with hemophilia will surface... We do not want anything we do
now to be interpreted by society (or by legal authorities) as agreeing with the
concept { as yet unproven { that AIDS can be spread by blood.74 It appears that
the blood industry was telling the public something other than what it actually
believed. However, Dr. Bove's report insisted that [w]e need to do whatever is
medically correct and that [w]e... will continue to react responsibility [sic] to
whatever scientic and medical information we have.75 He also acknowledged
that it might eventually become necessary to screen out donor populations who
are at high risk of AIDS, which [or practical purposes... means gay males.76
Meanwhile, the FDA was doing absolutely nothing to protect the
nation's blood supply from this new virus. In February of 1 983, researchers at
the University of California Medical Center at San Francisco publicly called on
the blood bankers to begin surrogate testing procedures.77 However, it appeared
that no one in the blood banking industry or at the FDA listened.
On March 4, 1 983, the U.S. Public Health Service nally issued
74Joseph Bove, Report to the Board Committee on Transfusion Tranmitted Diseases, Jan-
uary 24, 1983 (reprinted in Blood Supply Safety, supra note 4, at 73-4).
75ld.
76ld.
77Blood Supply Safety, supra note 4, at 9 (testimony of Dr. Marcus Conant).
11a statement of the CDC, the FDA, and the NIH, that laid out the rst set
of guidelines for protecting the blood supply from the AIDS virus. The vague
recommendations suggested that members of high-risk groups refrain from do-
nating blood, studies should be done to evaluate screening procedures for eec-
tiveness, and work should continue towards developing safer blood products.78
This recommendation was a broad compromise between the COC and the FDA
{ the CDC wanted vigorous donor screening and blood testing, while the FDA
favored the moderate restrictions proposed by the blood bankers.79
At the end of March, the FDA issued recommendations to centers
that collected blood and plasma. However, these recommendations were viewed
by some as simply watered-down recommendations from the blood banking in-
dustry itself.80 In addition, the guidance was purely in memorandum form and
was thus not binding. On March 21 and 24, 1 983, Dr. John Petricciani, Direc-
tor of the Oce of Biologics, sent memorandums indicating that centers should
institute educational programs to inform persons who are at an increased risk of
AIDS that they should not donate blood, re-educate personnel responsible for
donor screening to more readily identify the symptoms of AIDS, examine donors
for lymphadenopathy, keep track of donor's weight, and establish standard pro-
cedures for handling and disposing of plasma or blood that is believed to be
infected with the AIDS virus.81 However, notably missing from the guidelines
78Centers for Disease Control, Prevention of Acquired Immune Deciency Syndrome
(AIDS): Report of Inter-Agency Recommendations, 32 Morbidity and Mortality Wkly. Rep.
101(1 983).
79Shilts, supra note 1 8, at 242.
80Blood Supply Safety, supra note 4, at 11 (testimony of Dr. Marcus Conant).
81from John C. Petricciani, Director, Oce of Biologics, to All Establishments Collecting
Source Plasma, Recommendations to Decrease the Risk of Transmitting Acquired Immune
12was any mention of surrogate testing or donor screening of high-risk groups, and
thus the CDC's suggestions had clearly been rejected. The FDA had consid-
ered these possibilities but decided against them, evidently rejecting surrogate
testing because the value of such testing was unknown at that time.82 ln May
of 1 983, the Stanford University Blood Center became the rst major blood
bank to begin surrogate testing for evidence of AIDS.83 Dr. Edgar Engleman,
the medical director of the blood bank, believed it was important for the safety
of patients in the Stanford University Hospital, and now estimates that 50-100
cases of AIDS were prevented in their medical center alone by implementing this
testing.84 However, blood bankers criticized him and the press suggested that
testing was being done as a publicity stunt and a ploy to try to lure patients
from other hospitals.85
On July 7, 1 983, the FDA issued a nal rule stating that licensed
blood banks would only be inspected once every two years, replacing the pre-
vious rule that they would be inspected once every year.86 Blood center in-
spections were thus being cut back at the very time that AIDS was apparently
contaminating the blood supply. The yearly inspection policy was apparently
Deciency Syndrome (AIDS) from Plasma Donors, reprinted in BNA, supra note 4, at 100-
1(note there are two versions of this memo); BNA, supra note 4, at 94; Alert on AIDS, 17
FDA Consumer 2 (June 1 983).
82Blood Supply Safety: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
of the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce (Blood Supply Safety
II), 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., at 49 (1991) (statement of Dr. Gerald Quinnan, Jr., Acting
Director, FDA's Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research in 1991).
83Shilts, supra note 1 8, at 308. Note that the Stanford University Blood Center imple-
mented a surrogate test that used the ratio of helper to suppressor lymphocytes instead of
utilizing the hepatitis core antibody testing. Id
84Frontline, supra note 1 7.
85Shilts, supra note 18, at 410; Blood Safety Supply, supra note 4, at 96 (testimony of Dr.
Edgar Engleman).
8648 Fed. Reg. 26313 (1983).
13changed as part of the Reagan administration's sweeping deregulation eorts of
the early 1 980s, when the FDA's workforce was actually being cut.87 Appar-
ently, the blood industry also supported the cutback.88 A document was found
in which blood banks mentioned how they had successfully lobbied the FDA to
reduce the number of inspections to once every two years.89 The FDA claimed
that less frequent inspections will have no adverse eect in the manufacture
of safe, pure, and potent blood products.90 However, when the FDA changed
the inspection rate back to once every year in 1 988, FDA ocials indicated
that the increase in inspections would be an eective way to detect problems.
Dr. Gerald Quinnan, Jr., Acting Director for the FDA's Center for Biologics
Evaluation and Research in 1991, pointed out that enhancing surveillance also
results in our observing increased numbers of problems in blood banks91, while
Frank Young, Commissioner of the FDA in 1 988, suggested that the inspec-
tions were increased to be sure that a safe blood supply is made even safer.92
Thus, it appears that the FDA consciously reduced surveillance in 1983 with the
consequence that more problems would likely go undetected at a most critical
time.
On June 22, 1983, the AABB, CCBC, and the American Red Cross
issued another joint statement that again downplayed the risk of transfusion-
associated AIDS and in fact stated that there was only one AIDS case per
87Gaul, supra note 5.
88Id
89Frontline, supra note 1 7.
9048 Fed. Reg. 26313 (1983).
91BIood Supply Safety II, supra note 82, at 47 (statement of Dr. Gerald Quinnan, Jr.).
92Gaul, supra note 5.
14one million patients transfused.93 Although it was discovered that the one in a
million gure was grossly inaccurate, it was never corrected.94 Meanwhile, FDA
Commissioner Dr. Arthur Hull Hayes, Jr. said: I think the nation's blood supply
is safe, but there's no question that we have a new and growing problem with
AIDS.95 In August, Dr. Bove, still chairman of both the FDA's Blood Products
Advisory Committee and the Committee on Transfusion Transmitted Diseases
for the AABB, continued to publicly deny that there was any conclusive proof
that the blood supply was contaminated with the AIDS virus, again referring
to the one in a million gure.96
During December of 1 983, Dr. Dennis Donohue, the Director of
the FDA's blood and blood products laboratory, began advocating that the
industry adopt the hepatitis core antibody test.97 On December 1 5 of 1 983,
the FDA's Blood Products Advisory Committee met to debate the issue of
surrogate testing. The FDA had now recognized that there was a substantial
problem of AIDS in the blood supply, and thus they invited people from all
over the country to come to the meeting and present views and share their
experiences with any surrogate tests.98 Not surprisingly, the blood industry
continued to vigorously object to the use of these tests on the grounds that
the testing was costly, was not specic for AlDS, its use would result in the
exclusion of some safe donors, and its use could seriously threaten local blood
93Shilts, supra note 18, at 333; Dorney, supra note 1, at146.
94Dorney, supra note 1, at 147.
95As AIDS Scare Hits Nation's Blood Suppfy, U.S. News & World Report, July 25, 1983,
at 71.
96Shilts, supra note 18, at 361.
97Id, at 411.
98Frontline, supra note 1 7.
15supplies.99 The cost would include not only the cost of testing, but also the cost
of recruiting additional donors to replace those screened out by the testing.100
Michael Rodell, a representative of the plasma industry, suggested that a task
force be formed to further consider the use of surrogate testing for AIDS, and
the Advisory Committee unanimously agreed.101 The task force agreed to meet
in three months.102 Thus, nearly one year after the CDC had recommended
blood testing and donor screening, the FDA was still stalling.
It appears that the task force idea was one that the plasma industry
had come up with collectively. The evening before the December 1 5th Advisory
Committee meeting, ocials from the four major clotting factor manufacturers
had held a private meeting in a hotel room in Washington D.C., at which they
agreed to propose a task force to study the question of surrogate testing as a
way to delay the process.103 This was explained in a memorandum from an
ocial of Cutter Biologicals, the largest U.S.-based plasma manufacturer: This
proposal was one that had been agreed upon by all the fractionators the previ-
ous evening. The general thrust of the task force is to provide a delaying tactic.
It was generally agreed that core testing would eventually become a require-
ment.104 In addition, the Cutter ocial also wrote in private correspondence
that the anti-core testing would add a further measure of condence in prod-
uct safety at a relatively low cost for the products involved, and in fact Cutter
99Gaul, supra note 5.
100Id.
101Id.
102Shilts, supra note 18, at 411; Gaul, supra note 5.
103Frontline, supra note 17.
104Gaul, supra note 5.
16was already implementing the test at its collection cites.105 An internal memo
stated: We recommend that the implementation of core testing be accelerated
to the maximum degree possible to obtain a competitive advantage in the mar-
ketplace. We made no mention of our plans to the others.106 Thus, once again,
blood industry members were expressing privately much dierent opinions than
they were expressing publicly.
In January of 1 984, conclusive proof of transfusion-associated AIDS
was rst published in the New England Journal of Medicine.107 However,
Dr. Bove wrote a separate essay in the same issue of the New England Jour-
nal of Medicine claiming that whether the disease is caused by a transfusion-
transmitted infectious agent is still unknown... patients should be reassured
that blood banks are taking all possible steps to provide for safe blood transfu-
sions.108
In March of 1 984, other San Francisco blood banks followed Stan-
ford University Blood Center by announcing that they were going to begin sur-
rogate testing.109 However, many cited competitive pressure from other blood
banks as the reason for instituting testing instead of safety concerns, and the
blood banks immediately came under re from others in the blood banking
industry.110 Dr. David Dejongh, the Director of the blood bank at Charity
Hospital in New Orleans claims that his center did not begin surrogate testing
105Id
106Id
107Dorney, supra note 1, at 141.
108Shilts, supra note 18, at 410.
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17because of intensive pressure from the blood industry, including the American
Red Cross.111 It appeared that the industry was trying to hang together to
avoid having to use surrogate testing.112
The AIDS task force of the FDA Blood Products Advisory Com-
mittee met in March of 1 984 to study Dr. Donahue's suggestion that hepatitis
core antibody testing be implemented by the blood industry.113 The task force
voted not to require or recommend surrogate testing.114 In May of 1984, the
task force's ndings were issued in a formal report, which included a majority
report (joined by eight members) opposing surrogate testing and a minority
report (joined by three members, including Dr. Donahue) recommending hep-
atitis B core testing.115 The task force was industry dominated; it had only 2
non-industry members (one of whom was Dr. Donahue), with the remainder
of the task force consisting of six plasma industry members and three blood
bank members.116 The full FDA Advisory Committee adopted the conclusion
of the task force majority and did not recommend the hepatitis core antibody
testing.117
Interestingly, Dr. Thomas Asher, Chairman of the Board of Hemo-
Care (a manufacturer of blood products) and a member of the Board of Directors
of the American Blood Resources Association, later testied in court that: By 1
984, blood which was not tested by one of the following three tests: T4/T8 cell
111Bbood Supply Safety, supra note 4, at 94 (adavit of Dr. David Dejongh).
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18test, lymphocyte count or hepatitis B core-antibody was unreasonably danger-
ous. A reasonable blood bank would have at the very least performed one of the
above tests. To not test blood by any of the above three tests was unreasonable
and negligent.118 At this time, the FDA did not even recommend, much less
require, the use of surrogate testing.
On April 23, 1 984, Margaret Heckler, Secretary of Health and
Human Services, announced the discovery of the AIDS virus, and also claimed
that a blood test would be available within six months).119 Also in April of 1
984, the FDA released a statement that: on the basis of the information available
to date, it is possible that screening tests other than anti-core may ultimately
prove to be more predictive and generally useful in improving the safety of blood
and blood products. It would therefore be unwise to adopt anti-core testing to
the exclusion of other screening tests.120 It appeared, therefore, that the FDA
was simply waiting for an AIDS test.
By September of 1 984, the CDC had counted 80 cases of trans-
fusion AIDS and no one even debated whether AIDS was spread through the
blood supply anymore.121 Dr. Bove had even shifted his views and now argued
that the FDA should require hepatitis B core antibody testing.122 Nonetheless,
when hepatitis testing had been discussed again by the FDA's Blood Advisory
Committee during the summer of 1984 the Committee again voted not to require
118Blood Supply Safety, supra note 4, at 85 (adavit of Dr. Thomas Asher).
119Shilts, supra note 18, at 450-1.
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19the testing over Dr. Bove's object ions.123
In December of 1 984, the FDA revised its recommendations for
protection of the blood supply. The revisions broadened the class of donors
who should refrain from donating blood or plasma, outlined specic questions
that donors should be asked regarding symptoms of AIDS, listed additional re-
quirements for donors of plasma, and identied various procedures for voluntary
self-exclusion of donors.124 However, the FDA still did not recommend donor
screening for high-risk groups or any type of surrogate testing.
Finally, on March 2, 1 985, Secretary Margaret Heckler announced
the licensing of the rst AIDS test, produced by Abbott Laboratories.125 The
test was an antibody blood test known as the ELISA (enzyme-linked immunosor-
bent) assay which detects antibodies to HTLV-lll, the AIDS virus.126 The test
was approved for commercial use in blood banks, plasma centers, and public
health clinics.127 However, the AIDS test could not detect all carriers of the
virus because not everyone who is infected will have antibodies to the virus
when they donate blood.128
The FDA recommended that the blood industry utilize the new
ELISA test. Most blood banks were using the ELISA test by July of 1 985,
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20even though the FDA did not actually require the test to be used.129 However,
since the test was not required, many blood banks did not ever test the inventory
of blood they had on hand at the time that the AIDS test came out.130 Dr.
Art Silverglied of the AABB, has said that it was a mistake not to test the
current inventory, but has also said that he believes it was an honest mistake.131
In addition, there were some blood banks that did not begin using the still-
voluntary test so quickly.132
The FDA did not move towards actually requiring the use of the
ELISA test until 1 986, and a regulation was proposed on February 21, 1986
that would require every unit of human blood to be tested for the presence of
antibodies to HTLV-llI.133 The FDA stated that it believed that most blood
establishments will begin routine tests of blood and blood components for anti-
body to HTLV-lll before any nal rule based on this proposal is published in the
Federal Register.134 The FDA was apparently content to rely on the industry to
take voluntary precautionary steps, because the nal regulation requiring AIDS
testing did not become eective until February 4, 1 988.135 Thus, testing was
actually voluntary for three years after the test became available. By the time
the AIDS test was required by the FDA, 60% of America's 20,000 hemophiliacs
had been infected with the AIDS virus through contaminated clotting factors.136
Today all blood is screened for AIDS, hepatitis B, and hepatitis C
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21and this has not created the blood shortage feared by the blood industry.137
Many lawsuits have been brought by victims who were infected with AIDS
through transfusion or blood products against various members of the blood
industry, but most plaintis have not been successful.138 A class action lawsuit
was led in September 1993 against the ve blood product companies and the
National Hemophilia Foundation on behalf of 1 0,000 hemophiliacs who were
infected with the AIDS virus through contaminated blood products.139 How-
ever, it is generally very dicult to win a case against members of the blood
industry because: 1) the industry is shielded from strict liability and contract
claims in nearly every state by blood shield laws and 2) most courts have held
that the professional standard of care will apply on a negligence claim, thus
allowing the inadequate response of the entire industry to the AIDS crisis to
serve as a defense for an individual defendant.140
IV.Why?: The Reasons for the FDA's Failure to Protect the Na-
tion's Blood Supply
Dr. Conant told a Congressional subcommittee that: It is my view
that between 1 2-22,000 Americans were infected with [the AIDS virus] as a di-
rect result of blood transfusion, because of the failure of blood banks to screen
out high risk donors, the failure of the blood industry to try to accurately dis-
seminate information to their member blood banks, the failure of the regulatory
137Blood Safety Supply, supra note 4, at 1 (statement of Congressman Dingell).
138Dorney, supra note 1, ati 30.
139Frontline, supra note 17; Dorney, supra note 1, at lSOfn 151.
140Michael J. Miller, Strict Liability, Negligence and the Standard of Care for Transfusion-
Transmitted Disease, 36 Arizona Law Rev. 471 (Summer 1994); Blood Supply Safety, supra
note4, at 1 5 (testimony of Dr. Ross Eckert).
22Agency, namely the division of Biologicals of the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA), to demand minimum standards of donor evaluation and products
screening, and a failure of the Centers for Disease Control (COC) to demand
accountability of the blood industry and the blood regulators.141
Most people seem to agree that the blood industry and the FDA
failed to properly safeguard the nation's blood supply in the early 1 980s. Since
the blood industry is rmly under the regulatory control of the FDA, it would
have been easy for the government to step in and remedy the poor response
of the blood industry to this crisis, but it did not. The CDC could only oer
advice, it did not have the regulatory power to require donor screening or blood
testing.142 Only the FDA had that power, and they chose not to use it { they
never required aggressive donor screening or surrogate testing and in fact the
weak guidance they did provide was not even in the form of binding regula-
tion. In all fairness, however, it must be remembered that this was a time of
uncertainty and no one really knew how deadly AIDS would turn out to be.
Had the consequences that resulted been known, undoubtedly more aggressive
action would have been taken. However, even though the extent of the danger
was unknown, it was clear that there was some danger to the blood supply
and thus uncertainty cannot provide an easy excuse for inaction. Congress-
man Dingell called the FDA's regulatory policy of that time kinder and gentler,
and indeed commented that it was a far too kind and far too gentle version of
the now-discredited FDA-wide 'honor system' of the 1 980s.143 Indeed, current
141Blood Supply Safety, supra note 4, at 1 2 (statement of Dr. Marcus Conant).
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23FDA Commissioner David Kessler said in 1 993 that the 1 980s represented a
collegial approach to regulated industry and that the blood industry has gener-
ally not assumed adequate responsibility for putting in place and following the
basic quality assurance programs and standard operating procedures required
to assure the safety of the blood supply.144 He called for a change in the culture
and practices of the blood industry and of FDA as well.145
Dr. Francis of the CDC summarizes his view of what happened
during this period and why: '83 and '84 were the lost years and they were lost
on the rst year because of the Joe Bove-AABB-Red Cross bury your head in
the sand approach to AIDS. The rst year, they just kind of ignored it. And
then came the second year, starting in January of-or December of '83, going
onwards, where the Blood Product Advisory Committee said, 'Okay, now we
really do need to recommend hepatitis B testing, at least,' and then they all
voted, 'Well, we need a task force to evaluate it.' And by the time the task
force got to evaluate it, then Margaret Heckler and Bob Gallo stood up and
said, 'Now we're going to have a test,' and so a whole other year goes by and
they still did nothing. And so this combination of the rst year of sticking your
head in the sand and the second year of having your expectations come that we
have an HIV test around the corner, when you knew it was going to take a long
time, just combined to kill tens of thousands of Americans.146 This explanation
seems fairly reasonable, even if oversimplied. It is generally agreed that the
of the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce (Blood Supply Safety
III), 103rd Cong., 1 st Sess., at 1 (1 993)(statement of Congressman Dingell).
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24FDA relied on the industry for guidance and in fact the FDA clearly followed
the desires of industry over the recommendations of the COC during this entire
time period. In addition, there was some indication that the FDA was waiting
for an AIDS test when it issued its April 1 984 statement that hepatitis B testing
should not be used exclusively because other tests might later prove to be better.
Undoubtedly the promise of a test for the AIDS virus had some inuence on
the inaction of the blood industry and the FDA during 1984.
The central reason why the FDA never proposed any strong recom-
mendations or regulations during this period appears to be their reliance on the
desires of the blood industry. The FDA apparently blindly followed the advice
of the Blood Products Advisory Committee during this period, and that com-
mittee consisted almost exclusively of members of the blood industry at that
time.
So why was the blood industry so strongly opposed to taking safe-
guards to protect the nation's blood supply in the early 1 980s? When a Con-
gressional Subcommittee met to hold hearings regarding the safety of the blood
supply in 1990, Congressman Bliley asked: Was the decision not to test made for
purely economic reasons, at cost of countless lives and of thousands or perhaps
tens of thousands of blood-transfusion recipients now testing positive for the
AIDS virus?147 The decisions made in the early 1 980s by the blood industry
were surely not made on solely an economic basis. This really was a time of un-
certainty { the AIDS virus had not been isolated and there was thus obviously
147Bbood Safety Supply, supra note 4, at 4 (statement of Congressman Bliley).
25no way to test for it directly. There were, at least at the beginning, real doubts
on the part of some people whether this disease really existed. Thus it appears
that this was a situation where it was easy to slip into a state of denial and to
pretend there was not a major problem, that it was something more trivial than
it was. Dr. Engleman stated at a Congressional hearing: In my view, they were
acting in good faith and they were doing the best they could, but they were
blinded. They did not objectively analyze the data that was available.148
Although this tragic situation was undoubtedly not solely caused by cost
factors, they certainly played a very large role. At the meeting of the AIDS Task
Force of the FDA's Blood Products Advisory Committee, the blood bankers
argued that hepatitis core antibody testing would be too expensive, stating
that testing could add $1 2 to the cost of a unit of blood and that it would
also be costly to recruit new donors to replace the 6% of donors whose blood
would test positive for hepatitis core antibodies.149 They had similarly argued
cost at the January 4, 1983 meeting with the CDC. Dr. Aaron Kellner of the
New York Blood Center had stated at that it would cost New York City over $5
million to implement surrogate testing, including the cost of the tests, the cost
of the paper work, and the value of the blood discarded in the estimated 5%
of samples where a healthy donor would be ruled out by surrogate testing.150
He claimed that the cost would be $1 00 million a year nationally, and thus he
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26opposed widespread testing.151 It is not clear that the additional cost would
have really been unreasonable, however. Dr. Asher, Chairman of the Board of
HemoCare, claimed that his own company was doing surrogate testing during
this period and the price of his platelet concentrates were still signicantly lower
than those of a competing blood center nearby that did not do the testing.152
In addition, it seems reasonable to believe that additional costs of testing could
be passed along to consumers in the price of the blood or blood product. These
products are a matter of life and death { the American attitude has generally
been that price is no object when it comes to health care, and thus it seems
unlikely that a rise in the price of blood would not make people decide to stop
purchasing needed blood or blood products.
In addition to explicit cost concerns, the blood industry was con-
cerned about the lack of adequate donors. They were afraid that a requirement
of donor screening or blood testing would cause a blood shortage. As for donor
screening, they were afraid that too many donors would be eliminated and also
that the simple fact that personal questions about high risk behaviors were asked
would cause some people to become unwilling to donate blood voluntarily.153
As for surrogate testing, estimates at that time were that 3-6% of blood would
be rejected as a result of implementing hepatitis core.154 The blood bankers
were concerned about the amount of safe blood that would be rejected by these
surrogate tests since the tests were obviously not specic for the AIDS virus.155
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27There is some disagreement as to the blood industry's actual concerns in regard
to the potential blood shortage. Dr. Oscar Ratno, a hematologist at Case
Western Reserve University, believes that it was the fear of losing donors that
motivated the inertia about surrogate testing, fear that they would not have
the blood supply that was needed for the care of patients rather than a primary
concern about cost.156 However, Dr. Ross Eckert, Professor of Economics and
Legal Organization at Claremont McKenna College and member of the FDA's
Blood Products Advisory Committee from 1987 to 1 991, argues that these
supply concerns are in the end really arguments about operating costs because
the industry was deeply concerned about the cost and eort of replacing the
rejected donors that would be necessary to keep the supply high if surrogate
testing were implemented.157 Also, perhaps this was all tied into the fact that if
donors do not come to blood centers there will be no product to sell to hospitals
and patients and thus new measures might threaten the nancial viability of
the blood banks.158 In reality, all of these concerns were probably in the minds
of blood bankers around the country.
Another reason the blood industry did not want to require donor
screening was that screening out male homosexuals would be intrusive, uneth-
ical, and institutionalize a stigma on groups already prone to prejudice and
persecution.159 The blood industry allied themselves with the gay groups on
this issue, meeting with the National Gay Task Force in January of 1 983 and
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).
1571d, at 27 (statement of Dr. Ross Eckert), 76 (testimony of Dr. Ross Eckert).
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28together devising a statement asserting that donor screening was inappropri-
ate.160 Dr. Herb Perkins, the medical director of the Irwin Memorial Blood
Bank in San Fransisco, used gay rights arguments to argue against hepatitis
core antibody testing, claiming that the hepatitis testing would mark gay men
with a biological pink triangle.161 Although there may be valid civil rights
arguments for the proposition that donor screening of male homosexuals is in-
appropriate, it seems a stretch to use gay rights rhetoric to argue against blood
testing. Clearly a positive result on a hepatitis core antibody screening would be
kept condential and there is no discriminatory aspect to doing the same test on
all blood samples. This type of argument begins to make one wonder whether
the asserted civil rights concerns may have been used at least partially to cover
up the blood banker's fundamental desire to keep costs down and maintain the
status quo.
There was not any real pressure on the blood banks to take extra
precautions. According to Dr. Eckert, [i]n most communities, blood banks
are monopolies or cartels, so patients lack competitive market processes for
protection.162 Patients are generally unaware of what precautions need to be
taken, and in any case are not in a position to take the time to obtain information
when emergencies or illnesses requiring blood arise.163 In addition, the public
may rely on the FDA to protect them.164 Thus, the general public cannot
eectively produce competitive pressure on blood banks. It seems that the
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29hospitals that purchase the blood could have exerted pressure on the blood
banks, but they apparently did not do so. Consumers of blood products such as
clotting factors, however, can in fact exert pressure on manufacturers, and this
may explain the fact that clotting factor manufacturers were more willing to take
precautions than blood bankers (although even they fought formal requirements
even though many manufacturers took precautions individually).
In addition to the lack of competitive pressure at the time, the
blood bankers and blood product manufacturers lacked incentive to take new
safety measures because they generally did not fear future liability the way
other industries might. As mentioned above, the blood industry is shielded
from strict liability and contract claims by state blood shield laws and industry
custom will generally serve as a defense in a negligence action. This explains
the desire for the industry to hang together so that the standard of care for the
industry would be low. The immense criticism by the industry of those blood
banks that did institute new safety measures and the pressure on other blood
banks around the country to avoid beginning any new donor screening or blood
testing are consistent with the desire to make sure the industry custom did
not include donor screening or surrogate testing in an eort to avoid potential
liability later. Dr. David Dejongh, Director of the Blood Bank at Charity
Hospital in New Orleans during 1 983 and 1 984 has testied that his blood
bank was under heavy pressure not to begin surrogate testing and that the
blood banking industry feared that the institution of the Core test by some
blood banks would create a standard of care by which other blood banks would
30be required to abide.165 The industry apparently felt that they would not be
held accountable if they all insisted together that nothing needed to be done.
So, overall it appears that without sucient competition, liability or regulation,
the incentives of blood bankers to provide the service quality that consumers
want are relatively weak.166
So the question then becomes: Why did the FDA listen to the
blood industry instead of the CDC? It appears that from the beginning the
FDA may have been skeptical of the CDC. In general, dierent federal agencies
have dierent turfs, and each one is eager to protect its own territory.167 The
FDA may have become defensive early on, feeling that the COG was trying to
infringe on the FDA's authority to regulate the blood industry by so openly
recommending that the industry take specic precautions. At the rst meeting
in July 1 982, it has been reported that the FDA was keenly aware of maneuvers
for control of turf. Some FDA regulators resented the CDC's brash invasion of
what was plainly their territory, the blood industry.168 It appears that at least
at this rst meeting, some FDA representatives simply did not believe that this
so-called disease existed.169 At the January 4, 1 983 meeting, again the FDA
representatives seemed wary of the CDC and.. slightly irritated that the FDA's
turf had been so brazenly invaded.. ..170 If these reports of FDA's reaction
are accurate, the actions of the COC may have contributed to the FDA's lax
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31response and unwillingness to follow the CDC's recommendations.
The more central issue, however, involves the FDA's alliance with
the blood industry. Congressman Bliley asked in 1 990: Was there a conspiracy
of silence by the blood industry and its regulators to hide the problem of transfu-
sion AIDS?171 ln reality, it appears that a conspiracy was not necessary because
the FDA's decisions were virtually being made by the blood industry itself,
through the Blood Products Advisory Committee. According to Dr. Conant,
the FDA never attempted to bring into the review process individuals without
ties to the blood bank industry who were expert in evaluation and treatment
of patients with AIDS, or representatives from the hospital industry, American
medicine or indeed the general public who would be receiving the blood that was
drawn from infected donors.172 The FDA apparently did not even give much
if any weight to the suggestions of its own researchers, rejecting the suggestion
by Dr. Dennis Donohue, director for the blood and blood-products lab of the
FDA, that the FDA should require hepatitis core antibody testing. Indeed, Dr.
Donohue, stated that given the task force membership, all eorts at initiating
testing were doomed. Members were either in the blood industry or allied with
blood interests... Both the task force and the blood advisory committee were
clubbish groups devoted to little more than protecting the interests of blood
banks.173 The 1 988 Presidential Commission on the l-IIV Epidemic cited as an
obstacle to progress the FDA's heavy reliance on the blood industry for advice
171Blood Supply Safety, supra note 4, at 4 (statement of Congressman Bliley). at 11 (testi-
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32on what standards to set { a relationship that presents a signicant opportunity
for conicts of interest to arise.174
The FDA has traditionally placed a great amount of condence in
the blood industry to regulate itself.175 The FDA's Blood Products Advisory
Committee was formed in 1980 to advise the Commissioner in discharging his
responsibilities as they relate to assuring safe and eective biological products
and related medical devices.176 Although the Committee's charter only provides
that it serve to give advice, in reality the Committee helps to shape FDA's poli-
cies, and FDA ocials virtually always follow the decisions and advice of the
Committee.177 The members were largely from the industry, until more diver-
sity emerged in the later 1 980s. Dr. Asher stated that it's insular to a fault
and it's very protective of its own self-interests, and [e]ven today, it remains
what I call an Old Boys' Club.178 Not only does the Advisory Committee con-
sist mainly of allies of the industry, but Dr. Eckert, a former member of the
Committee, stated that the information that the Committee receives in general
is heavily skewed in favor of the blood banking industry over consumers.179 He
cites the fact that blood banks and their trade associations appear at Commit-
tee meetings consistently while consumers are virtually never represented.180
Thus, Eckert claims that the Committee and the FDA as a whole simply can-
not make balanced decisions because they do not receive balanced information
174Presidential Report, supra note 4, at 78.
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33and advice.181
The FDA undoubtedly appoints members of the blood industry to
the Advisory Committee because it feels that they are very knowledgeable about
these issues and thus make good advisors. However, the FDA must remember
that it does have its own researchers and that members of any industry are
always at least somewhat self-interested. The blood industry is no dierent, and
thus their expertise, while it certainly provides a valuable source of information
and advice, is not sucient to justify such extensive control as was allowed
between 1 982 and 1 985.
It could be argued that part of the FDA's inadequate reaction to
the crisis of AIDS in the blood supply was a consequence of its limited resources.
Dr. Francis, a CDC epidemiologist who has been extremely critical of the FDA's
response to this crisis, admitted that the federal government was very limited in
its resources, including the FDA and CDC, and the responsibility... was turned
over to the blood bankers and they were the only ones that could respond
fast enough.182 Indeed, Frank Young, FDA Commissioner in 1 988, said that
the agency was forced to adopt a crisis-management style due to its limited
cadre of inspectors and overall cutbacks at the agency dating to the Carter
administration... As a result of this strategy, the FDA is forced sometimes
to disregard problems.183 FDA's sta was cut from 7,799 to 6,963 full-time
employees (nearly 11%) between January 1 981 and 1987. However, the limited
resources of the FDA do not seem to provide a valid justication for its specic
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34decisions not to recommend aggressive donor screening or surrogate testing since
the costs of those measures would have been borne primarily by the industry
and not the FDA. The FDA did in fact spend the money to bring the Advisory
Committee together numerous times and to assemble an AIDS task force, and
it seems that a recommendation to implement donor screening or surrogate
testing would not have imposed signicant additional costs on the FDA, at
least if recommendations were issued instead of actual regulations (which would
require enforcement resources). The FDA's untimely decision to decrease the
frequency of inspections in June of 1 983, however, may actually have been
at least partially caused by the decrease in its resources, as the number of
inspectors was decreased 22% between 1 977 and 1 984.184 Nevertheless, even
that reason seems inexcusable since the crisis of a dangerous new disease in the
blood supply should have take priority over other areas under FDA's jurisdiction
when allocating scarce resources.
One additional concern that may have inuenced FDA's decision
not to recommend aggressive donor screening may have been the fear that they
might be sued by gay or civil rights activists. The FDA and members of its
Advisory Committee may have been worried that if they were to recommend or
require donor screening that would eliminate gay donors they would be faced
with a claim alleging discrimination against gays. Thus, they may have felt that
it was inadvisable to risk a lawsuit when there was really no risk of the FDA
being sued if they did not require donor screening.
184Id.
35Finally, it seems likely that, at least in part, the general course of
action taken in this country regarding AIDS in the blood supply was aected by
sheer politics and individual agendas. At the January 4, 1 983 meeting, it was
clear that each group had come with its own agenda, and on most lists, stopping
the potential spread of AIDS was secondary.185 A reporter who attended that
meeting remarked that the meeting was an excellent example... of when vested
interests come into conict with the bigger good, and people chose to side with
the vested interest.186 Gays were concerned about civil rights, blood bankers
were concerned about their own nancial viability, and hemophiliacs were con-
cerned about the cost of their clotting factors. It is very possible that the FDA
was worried about trampling on the interests of any of these groups, since they
are all organized groups with potentially powerful lobbies.
V.What can be done? Proposed solutions to prevent such failures
in the future
It is clear that there are signicant problems with the way the FDA
responded to the problem of the AIDS virus contaminating the blood supply
in the early 1 980s. What is not so clear is what the strategy should be for
the future when similar situations arise. Dr. Eckert noted that it is critical
that the FDA and the blood banking industry have a plan to cope with the
next lethal bloodborne virus or other agent when it arrives.., other than to
primarily wait for better medical tests to be developed as they did in the case of
hepatitis and AIDS.187 The 1988 Presidential Commission on the HIV Epidemic
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36recommended that the FDA should dene a mechanism that quickly identies
a new threat to the safety of the blood supply and implements procedures that
will abrogate that threat in order to ensure that the nation's blood supply is
never contaminated.188 However, they did not make any specic suggestions as
to how this should be done.
A.Changing the way the FDA obtains information and makes deci-
sions
The one change that commentators tend to agree on is that the
makeup of the FDA's Blood Advisory Committee must be changed. As of
March 1984, when the AIDS task force of the FDA Blood Products Advisory
Committee was formed, virtually all members of the Advisory Committee (in-
cluding the chairman) were either from the blood industry or allied with blood
interests, and there were no members whose role it was to represent consumer
interests, according to Dr. Dennis Donahue, director for the blood products lab-
oratory of the FDA at that time.189 As of 1 989, there were 11 voting members
on the Committee, including one hematologist, one pathologist, one economist,
ve medical school faculty, and three blood bankers, with the chairman be-
ing from the blood banking industry.190 In addition, there was one nonvoting
consumer representative and one nonvoting plasma industry representative.191
The 1 988 Presidential Commission on the HIV Epidemic recom-
mended that the Advisory Committee be restructured so that it represents the
188Presidential Report, supra note 4, at p. 79.
189Shilts, supra note 1 8, at 434.
190Blood Supply Safety, supra note 4, at 29 (statement of Dr. Ross Eckert).
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37entire blood products community, the plasma industry, the related academic
community, and one or more public members.192 Dr. Eckert, an economist
appointed to the FDA's Blood Advisory Committee in 1 987, has proposed very
specic changes in the Committee. He advocated elimination of the nonvot-
ing industry representative, because [t]he committee gets adequate advice from
blood products manufacturers from the oor each meeting.193 In addition, Dr.
Eckert believes that the consumer representative should be given a vote, as
well as appointing additional voting members who are expected to represent
consumers.194 Physicians who specialize in relevant areas and primarily treat
patients with diseases that use a lot of blood or blood products would be ex-
cellent choices to represent consumers while also serving as an early warning
system of new problems in the blood supply.195 Dr. Eckert also argues that
only one member of the committee should be a blood banker, and that person
should not be chairman of the committee. He believes that blood bankers are
very well represented at every meeting and the committee thus gets plenty of
their advice on almost every subject.196 Finally, Dr. Eckert proposes that an
economist should continue to sit on the Committee to provide a society-wide
perspective.., of the eects of blood safety.197
The main point to remember is that the FDA exists to protect con-
sumers, NOT the blood industry itself. Dr. Eckert has said that [t]he FDA has
192Presidential Report, supra note 4, at 79.
193Blood Supply Safety, supra note 4, at 30 (statement of Dr. Ross Eckert).




38over-relied on blood bankers to set the minimum standards it has, and that has
resulted in a trade-o between the health interests of consumers and the inter-
ests of the blood banks.198 Such a trade-o is simply inappropriate since the
FDA's mission is to protect the public health. It seems that there is a natural
conict of interest when blood bankers and those clearly allied with the blood
industry are advising the agency that regulates them. Limiting the number
of blood bankers to one, as suggested by Dr. Eckert, thus seems appropriate
because of this conict of interest. However, it seems unfair to have a repre-
sentative of the blood banking industry while not allowing a representative of
the blood products industry to serve on the Committee. Dr. Eckert's argument
that manufacturers do not need to be represented by having a member on the
Committee because the Committee already gets abundant advice from the blood
products manufacturers does not provide a distinction from the blood bankers
since he agrees that blood bankers also give plenty of advice to the Committee
at each meeting. The perspectives of the two dierent segments of the blood
industry may be dierent and thus both segments should be represented instead
of just one, out of fairness and a desire to achieve the goal of getting informa-
tion from all possible sources and perspectives. Blood industry representatives
should not be eliminated from the Committee completely because they are very
knowledgeable and may provide important insights regarding the reality of the
industry.
However, it seems critical that an advisory committee should be
198Gaul, supra note 5.
39made up largely of people that will not be biased in favor of the blood industry.
This would include professors, physicians, and independent researchers who
have special expertise in the area of blood and blood products. The majority
of the Committee should consist of neutral individuals who can evaluate data
objectively and give informed opinions about the scientic information and the
potential societal impact of FDA's action or inaction. Finally, the Committee
should contain two informed public or consumer members who can serve as
advocates for the consumer perspective and thus provide some balancing to
oset the two blood industry members.
In addition, the advice of the Blood Advisory Committee must
not be automatically followed over the advice from the members of FDA's own
blood product laboratory. The recommendations of the Advisory Committee are
nearly always accepted by the FDA.199 The FDA took the Advisory Committee
Task Force's recommendation over that of their own blood product laboratory
in deciding not to require surrogate testing in 1 984. The FDA has its own
researchers for a purpose, and it seems appropriate to look to them for guidance
along with the Advisory panel { in essence, a balance must be struck and no
one should hold the proverbial trump card.
In addition to restructuring the FDA's system for obtaining advice
from within its own agency, the FDA must try to work more closely with the
CDC and seriously consider their recommendations. The CDC is the govern-
ment agency that deals with epidemiology and has vast experience with blood-
199Id.
40borne diseases. The FDA should take advantage of that specialized knowledge
and give great weight to CDC's suggestions instead of ghting them, as appears
to have been the approach in the AIDS crisis. Perhaps it would be advanta-
geous for the CDC and FDA to meet regularly in order to discuss potential
blood borne diseases, in a setting where the blood industry representatives and
other special interests groups are not present and the agencies can try to work
together without playing the games that public turf battles entail. In the end,
however, it seems that the FDA must simply learn to accept the fact that the
CDC will usually learn of bloodborne diseases that pose a danger to the na-
tion's blood supply rst because of the focus of that agency. The FDA must
take information from the CDC very seriously and work with them to identify
appropriate safeguards.
As well as improving relations with the CDC specically, the FDA
needs to foster closer relationships with researchers and medical and epidemio-
logical experts in general in order to receive all relevant information in a timely
fashion. The 1 988 Presidential Commission recommended that the FDA's
Blood Advisory Committee closely monitor advances in research and develop-
ment to determine what changes in policy and practice are needed to preserve
the safety of the blood supply.200 Dr. Eckert also suggested that steps be taken
to improve relationships between blood banks and medical research and teach-
ing institutions so that new discoveries can be quickly applied by the blood
banking community.201 This closer relationship would be useful to the FDA as
200Presidential Report, supra note 4, at 79.
201Blood Supply Safety, supra note 4, at 37 (statement of Dr. Ross Eckert).
41well in providing quality regulation to protect the blood supply { an uninformed
committee cannot provide up-to-date advice on what precautions are needed.
Adding more researchers and physicians to the Advisory Board would be a
step towards increasing the communication between the FDA and the medical
research community.
B.Adopting a policy of better safe than sorry
Blood, obviously, is essential to life. The safety of the blood sup-
ply is of utmost importance { if blood is unsafe, people die. It's that simple.
Considering this fact, it seems that blood is one area where it is clearly best to
adopt a policy of better safe than sorry. In the face of uncertainty regarding
the threat of AIDS to the blood supply and how it could best be controlled, the
FDA chose to do virtually nothing and take no precautions. Instead, the FDA
should have done something, even if it may not have been the perfect solution
in hindsight, and taken extra precautions when faced with this uncertainty.
The FDA should have required surrogate testing as soon as it was
recommended by the COC. It appears that key researchers at that time believed
that surrogate testing should be done and would be partially eective in stopping
the spread of the virus. The FDA should not have been swayed by the interested
blood banking industry into saying the testing should not be done, but instead
should have been listening to the more objective scientists, including the director
of it's own blood products laboratory, who recommended the testing. When it
comes to the safety of our blood supply, cost should basically be no object. The
FDA's duty is not to weigh the overall costs and benets of certain actions, it's
42duty is to protect the safety of the blood supply. The cost of surrogate testing
should not have been a consideration for the FDA when it was determining what
to require of the blood industry. In the future, in situations where an infectious
agent can be partially screened out with surrogate testing, that testing should
be required by the FDA in the interests of keeping the blood supply as safe as
possible, even though it cannot be kept completely safe with only a surrogate
test. A partial solution is better than no solution at all. The FDA's policy of
the early 1 980s seems to have been If we can't x it, why even try when it
should have been OK, we can't x it, but lets do the best we can and try to
keep our losses to a minimum. It is inexcusable to sit around and wait until
a denitive test is available, even if it is to be available in the near future {
instead the alternative testing should be implemented and continued until the
primary testing actually becomes a reality.
Surrogate testing could be ordered overnight without going through
the lengthy notice and comment rulemaking procedure if the FDA for good cause
nds (and incorporates the nding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in
the rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are.., contrary to the
public interest.202 It seems that evidence of an epidemic that could be partially
controlled would be sucient to deem the delay caused by notice and comment
procedures to be contrary to the public interest.
If the FDA does not wish to require surrogate testing, it may want
to consider an alternative system for addressing the issue. In 1 978, the FDA
202Administrative Procedure Act, x 5 53(b)( B).
43issued a nal regulation requiring that blood be labeled with whether the blood
was drawn from a volunteer or paid donor.203 The new labeling requirement was
believed to result in at most a minimal cost increase, while it signicantly aids in
reducing the incidence of posttransfusion hepatitis, and.., also promotes blood
therapy safety and is therefore a valid, albeit partial, answer to the problem.
204A similar regulation could have been enacted in response to the
AIDS crisis { the FDA could have required the label of blood prod-
ucts to state whether or not surrogate testing had been done on the blood and
what type of testing had in fact been done. In addition, an extensive educa-
tional eort could have been undertaken at the same time to inform consumers,
but most importantly physicians and hospitals, of the importance of using blood
that has been tested.
If the labeling requirement was used and physicians and hospitals
were adequately informed, the forces of competition would be allowed to play
out in the marketplace. Physicians and hospitals would learn to dierentiate
between the safety levels and quality of blood from dierent sources, and thus
blood banks and blood product manufacturers would be forced to compete with
each other on the basis of safety. A labeling requirement along with needed
education to those people deciding which products to buy would increase com-
petition among blood banks on a local and regional level, which would tend to
force the industry to keep the safety levels high without the government having
to actually require the surrogate testing. In addition, the concerns of the blood
20343 Fed. Reg. 2142 (1978).
204Id.
44industry in the early 1 980s that nationwide implementation of surrogate test-
ing techniques would threaten the nancial viability of some blood banks and
possibly cause a blood shortage as well would be addressed because the more
competitive market created by a labeling requirement would allow for untested
(and thus less safe) blood to remain on the market if there was sucient demand
for it. This demand would be created if there was not enough safe blood avail-
able or if some people could not aord the higher priced blood that had been
tested. This labeling scheme would probably not completely eliminate untested
blood from the market, but it would go a long way towards it, and certainly
goes much farther than doing nothing at all.
The FDA should also consider donor screening of high-risk donors
as soon as high-risk groups can be identied when there is any concern over
the safety of the blood supply. The FDA was hesitant to exclude the gay
population from donating blood from the very beginning. Although it would be
politically dicult, it seems that precautions such as this would be preferable
to complete inaction. If there are specic areas, such as San Francisco in this
case, where a large part of the blood supply comes from high-risk donors, then
accommodations can be made to phase out those donors or to allow some of
them to continue donating to preserve the blood supply in general. However,
that should be the exception and not the rule. The FDA allowed such city-
specic arguments to dictate the rule in the early 1 980s, when a exible but
determined approach to do everything possible to stop the spread of this virus
would have been much more appropriate.
45It is important that the FDA provide stringent and strong regula-
tion of the blood industry. Given that the blood industry is virtually immune
from tort liability, the responsibility of protecting consumers lies with the fed-
eral agency. The FDA is the only deterrent on the blood industry's conduct.205
This means that the FDA must be aggressive in its rulemaking and enforcement
in order to keep the industry in line and protect the nation's blood supply. In-
spections should occur annually, and violations must be punished. Clear and
vigorous binding regulations must be implemented instead of relying on volun-
tary compliance with vague recommendations. And most of all, the FDA must
stop relying on the industry it regulates for advice and remember that FDA's
decisions must be made with the sole motivation of preserving the safety of the
nation's blood supply.
205Dorney, supra note 1, at 1 66.
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